Middle Eastern Studies

The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Rum?

F. Asli Ergul
Published online: 19 Jun 2012.

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or *Rum*?

F. ASLI ERGUL

The Ottoman social model was based on the *millets*. Although the word *millet* means 'nation' in Turkish, it was used as the synonym for the term *cemaat* (religious community) in the Ottoman Empire.[1] The *millet* was a form of organization and a legal status bestowed by the Ottoman sultan on the believers of monotheistic religions (*ehl-i zimmet*) such as Christianity or Judaism. As various non-Muslim communities were annexed to the Empire, the Sultan recognized their formal status and granted his protection via a societal treaty called *ahidname*.[2] The Ottoman *millets* lived within their own social, cultural and economic milieus and had a great deal of autonomy, which meant that they could set their laws and collect and distribute taxes, as long as they accepted the rule of the Ottoman sultan. Muslims were the majority and the main *millet* of the empire, and were named *millet-i hakime* (sovereign nation). The other *millets* were the Greek Orthodox, Jews and Armenians. The number of Ottoman *millets* increased in time and like the main religious affiliations, some sects began to be seen as distinct *millets*. The Ottoman Empire was not only a socio-cultural collection of these different *millets* but also a symbiosis of them all.

It is difficult to frame a definition of 'identity' in the Ottoman Empire, whether the distinctive sub-identities of Ottoman *millets* or the official all-encompassing identity of Ottomanness. Although some particularistic definitions based on 'pure' Islamic or Turkish 'substance' seem tempting, they do not fit the complicated structure of the Ottoman Empire. Its imperial configuration was more like a combination of varieties. The cosmopolitan social construction of the Ottoman Empire – Islamic tradition, Turkish heritage, the background of Byzantium and also numerous ethnic and religious cultures – was a synthesis. It would be reductionist to see the six-centuries-long empire that spread over three continents as a 'pure' Turkish or Muslim state. Likewise, reading Ottoman history with contemporary nationalist glasses would be another kind of reductionism. Evaluating Ottoman identity from the viewpoints of current nation-state identities may lead historical analysis towards *chronofetishism*, a mode of ahistoricism evaluating the past with present ideas. Contemporary belief systems charged with modern nation-state constructs do not supply the appropriate ground for understanding the past practices of old societies. In other words, historical analysis of the Ottoman Empire should be detached from contemporary nationalist rhetoric in order to understand the past, not to legitimize the present. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of Ottoman identity calls for an

impartial stand against any modern nationalist discourse, Turkish, Greek or Arab. To this end, the term *Rum* may be key. Referring either to the Greeks of the empire or to the geographical hegemony of the Ottoman state, the concept of *Rum* enriches the content of Ottoman identity and enables a common ground for Turkish and Greek nationalisms, isolated from nationalist history writings.

Rum was generally used by the Ottomans, and now by the Turks, for the Orthodox people of Greek origin in Anatolia and its surroundings. Etymologically, it derives from the term 'Roman', the people of the Eastern Roman Empire. The Greek and Orthodox people of the Ottoman Empire were mainly named the *Rum millet*, and were seen as the direct heirs of the Eastern Roman Empire. Besides denoting a *millet*, *Rum* had a much more complex meaning beyond Orthodoxy or Greekness. It also highlighted the privileged socio-cultural identity of the Ottoman ruling elites and demonstrated Ottoman sovereignty over large domains. The idea was to underline the link between the territorial domains of the Ottoman and Roman empires and strengthen dominion over the same realm. However, this meaning of *Rum* is usually 'ignored' in contemporary analysis of Ottoman history, because of its contradictory nuance with modern nation-state constructions in the region or because of indifference. This article aims to discuss this 'ignored' aspect of Ottoman identity and suggest a place within the widely acknowledged Islamic and Turkish interpretations of the Ottoman Empire.

Ambiguity is not limited to the term *Rum* in Ottoman identity. The ethnic basis of the empire is a common topic of debate as well. It is common ground that the official language of the Ottoman state was Turkish, Anatolians were mostly defined as Turkish-speaking Muslims and the dynastic blood ties with the Central Asian Turkic clan Kayi were accepted. However, there was no ethnic or nationalist meaning attributed to the term 'Turk' in the modern sense. Instead, the socio-cultural structure of the Muslim Anatolian people, mostly peasants, was underlined by labelling them as Turks, from whom the Ottoman state elites preferred to be distant. The distance between the ruling elite and the ruled people was the backbone of the Ottoman social system. To some extent, this social division, regardless of ethnic ties but with state centrism, was the nucleus of Ottoman identity. The conflictual picture of the ethnicity of the Ottoman Empire, beyond official language or ancestral bonds, should be carved out in order to develop a deeper analysis of Ottoman history.

In addition to ethnic debates, religious identity in the Ottoman Empire is another area to be clarified. The multi-religious structure of society and the heterodoxy in Anatolian Islamic culture make any Ottoman historian realize there was not an all-round *Shariat* (Islamic state) in the Ottoman Empire. Islam was accepted as the dominant belief system which influenced the social, administrative or judicial constructs of the Ottoman Empire, but it was interpreted in a way which supported the authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Hence, instead of Islamic Ottoman, 'Ottoman Islam' may be a better term to understand the religious structure of the Ottoman Empire.

Turkishness or Islam may be questionable but both are used widely in defining Ottoman identity. Despite its undeniable importance in the days of the Ottoman Empire, the concept of *Rum* is hardly noticed today in many historical analyses. Other than ethnic, religious or nationalist implications, the Ottoman dynasty, by defining itself as *Rum*, internalized the hegemonic and multi-cultural structure of the

Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire). Obviously it was a declaration of the Ottoman Sultan's seizure of the heritage of the Eastern Roman Empire. Although this title was not recognized by either the Greeks or the Europeans, the Ottoman dynasty defined itself as the successor to the same territories on which Byzantium had ruled for more than a millennium. A cultural and territorial bond, not an ethnic one, with the Eastern Roman Empire and their direct heirs in the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox Greeks, was underlined with the *Rum* identification. Basically, the *Rum* Ottoman identity created a common ground for contemporary national identities. Nevertheless, the *Rum* identity of the Ottoman Empire has been a neglected part of history, mainly abandoned to the dusty pages of Ottoman scripts. The citizens of homogenizing nation-states founded on the Ottoman lands of Greece and Turkey were not seen to be keen enough to find out all aspects of their Ottoman past in order to reveal the possible bonds between them. This article aims to reverse the official nationalist discourse by deconstructing the 'taken for granted' definitions of the Ottoman Empire and its identity. Its Islamic and Turkish endorsements will be questioned, while its *Rum* character, hitherto ignored, will be revisited.

Although labelling the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim and/or a Turkish empire is widespread in most history books, a cautious approach should be taken. First of all, to accept each period and part of the Ottoman Empire as unique, constant or monolithic could be misleading. The Ottoman Empire lasted for more than 600 years and spread over three continents at the height of its power, controlling Anatolia, the Middle East, South-Eastern Europe and North Africa. The assimilation of differences was not adopted as an official policy. All Semitic religions were given the right to live in their own social and cultural systems in return for their loyalty to the sultan. In fact, many people believe that there may not have been such a long-lasting empire had the Ottoman state applied strict religious assimilation. It was either because of tolerance or as a way to preserve the territories. It is obvious that this system, which allowed a large space for different religions, cultures or ethnicities under the authority of the Ottoman state, turned Ottoman identity into a colourful synthesis. Islam and Turkishness were the two main strands within this synthesis, but other strands, especially the *Rum*, had more effect on Ottoman identity than expected. In order to understand this colourful picture of Ottoman identity, it has to be deconstructed. Islam and Turkishness will be the starting point to examine the place of *Rum* culture.

At the outset, Islam was the predominant element in the Ottoman structure. The *gaza* tradition (war conducted in the name of Islam) of the Ottoman Beylik in the thirteenth century encouraged expansion into Christian lands. While it conquered these lands, it met with different religions, cultures and ethnicities. Although the Islamic character of the state was beyond discussion, there was no open pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam, if the higher taxes of the non-Muslims were put to one side. Nor was the Ottoman Empire a secular state. Islam had always been the reference point in any judicial, administrative or social issue. Although non-Muslims were free to practise their religious duties and were exempt from the Islamic code, the Muslim community was, on the other hand, entirely subject to it. Every kind of social, economic or political issue was conducted within the limits of Islamic law.

Islam had always been an important defining feature of the empire since its formation. The name of the dynasty, 'Ottoman' (Osmanli), originates from the

Turkish-Islamic name Osman, the name of the founder of the empire. However, in time the Turkish essence fell behind the Islamic character. The tradition of giving Turkish names or titles to the dynastic family was abandoned during later periods. For instance, the earlier Turkish-Islamic names of some sultans, like Orhan and Beyazid, were not used after the takeover of the Caliphate from the Mamluks in 1517, after the Ridaniye War. Yet, until the era of Yavuz Sultan Selim, the victor in the Ridaniye War, the alternative title of *Bey*, which means 'hegemonic' in Turkish tradition, was used as one of the sultan's delineations. The Turkish appellation *Bey* and Islamic title *Sultan* were used interchangeably until the era of Yavuz Sultan Selim. However, he chose to abandon the Turkish name *Bey* and preferred the Islamic name *Sultan*: 'Sultanu'l-Mu'azzam', 'Sultanu's-Selatin' or 'Sultanu'l-Arab vel-Acem'.[3] Increasingly, Arabic-origin names for the sultans, like Abdulaziz, Abdulmecit or Abdulhamit, became widespread.[4] Turkishness was never forgotten, but it was concealed with an Islamic cover, increasing in the nineteenth century. The caliphate became the outward manifestation of the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire. Halil Inalcik pins the absolute power of the sultan down to the caliphate and *Shariat*. This was the base of the political and social superstructure of the empire and this politico-religious structure culminated in the office of sultan-caliph, according to Inalcik.[5] However, the Ottoman caliphate system had its unique features. It was not the caliphate but the sultanate that was most valued in the Ottoman Empire. The sultan was the supreme authority. In fact, when a sultan acceded to the throne, he was offered the *biat* (fealty) to the position of his sultanate, not to his caliphate.[6] In other words, the authority of the Ottoman dynasty had always kept its superiority over the institution of the caliphate.

The application of Islam in the Ottoman Empire had a unique character different from other Islamic states. The Ottoman historian François Georgeon called this uniqueness 'Ottoman Islam'. Georgeon explained this term by an irony in the application of Islam in the empire. In fact, Ottoman Islam applied the Hanafi School of law which is grounded in the jurisprudence of Abu Hanifa. Although the Hanafi School does not develop a comprehensive system towards Islamic codes, any possibility of change or reinterpretation of the text is not accepted by it. *Ictihat* (interpretation of Koran) is prohibited because the Koran is believed to be perfect. Therefore, neither *Kelam* (Islamic theology) nor *Fikih* (canon law) are welcomed. Georgeon points out that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were distinct for Ottoman Islam because of the conservative Orthodoxy during these centuries. On the other hand, the state never lost its control over religion and religious institutions. The traditional (*orfi*) law which developed according to the cultural and social heritage of the Ottoman state was an inseparable part of Islam. To this end, the Ottoman Empire was not a *Shariat* according to Georgeon.[7] In fact, when the Ottoman state's superiority over Islamic codes is taken into account, it is clear that the Islamic system of the Ottoman Empire was far from conventional *Shariat*. Moreover, there had been a deep heterodox Islamic culture in Anatolia which can be traced back to the years before the foundation of the Ottoman state. There were many respected dervishes and a Sufi belief among the Anatolian people which presented a different picture from the Hanafi School. However, it is clear that Islam had an important impact on the Ottoman state and the Ottoman people, either as Orthodox Hanafi *Shariat* or as heterodox Sufism.

The Islamic system and the Ottoman state were in harmony. To this extent, İlber Ortayli does not hesitate to say that the Ottoman state was a 'Muslim state'.[8] In fact, being a Muslim was the first condition of being a statesman in the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Ozbaran defines *sine qua non* conditions of being a good 'Ottoman'' for someone who wanted to be a member of the upper class. In order to be an 'Ottoman', one should work in the military or any other service of the state, should be a good Muslim who obeyed Islamic doctrine and should know the Ottoman way of life which absorbed the high Islamic traditions. There was a whole Sunni attitude which entailed a class-based social structure and accordance with Muslim features and traditions. Moreover, language skill in the Ottoman language, which was originally Turkish but enriched with Arabic and Persian elements, was a pre-condition of attaining the upper class. A person good enough to internalize these requirements was accepted as a good Ottoman. In other words, *askeri* people could come from different ethnic origins but they met at the common identity of being a Muslim Ottoman. Although they were expected to be a Muslim at birth or convert to it, they did not need to forget their ethnic, cultural or social differences. There were no ethnic classifications between these Muslim class members, at least until the last century of the empire.[9] A child born non-Muslim could rise to the highest positions in the military or diplomacy as long as he converted to Islam. There were many Albanian, Arab, Armenian or *Rum vezir-i azams* (grand vizier) or *pashas* (general) in Ottoman history. They were not expected to forget their culture or traditions, but they had to express their belief in Islam and live within the Islamic code, no matter what their ethnicity was.

Within this flexible understanding of ethnicity, Turkishness was, for a long time, one of the ethnic identities within the empire, neither superior nor inferior. Turkish identity had to wait until the nationalist turn of the nineteenth century for its new definition in terms of a national identity. It was in the last era of the Ottoman Empire that Turkishness was attributed a national definition. Hence, the journey of the name 'Turk' during the Ottoman Empire should be discussed.

When Ottoman documents are analysed, it is noticeable that the term 'Turk' was well-known among Ottoman people and the state. However, there was no clear definition. It had different meanings at different times of the empire. Only the existence of the Turk is apparent and clear, not its meaning. But the Turkish heritage in the Ottoman state cannot be ignored. In fact, the official language of the Ottoman bureaucracy was Turkish, although many Arabic or Persian words were adopted into it. Moreover, the *millet* system created an appropriate atmosphere for ethnic and cultural differences to survive. Since every national construction needs social, historical and cultural grounds, it is possible to think that this system indirectly contributed to the national uprisings in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Certainly, Turkishness was not an exception. However, it had never become the major ethnic identity of the Ottoman state or people. In fact, the Ottoman state constructed its own state identity, based on the concept of *Devlet-i Aliye* (the Sublime State) and the Ottoman people lived without any ethnic awareness for a long time.

Hence, the identity of the Ottoman Empire becomes problematic and there are various definitions and approaches to Ottoman identity. One of the most plausible answers comes from Halil Inalcik. He defines the identity of the Ottoman Empire,

established on Balkan and Arab lands, as a plural identity and adds that 'the Ottoman Empire was not a Turkish Empire'.[10] Its imperial construct over many different ethnicities, peoples, religions and territories made it impossible easily to define the empire as a Turkish state. Probably because of this uncertainty about Ottoman identity, Selim Deringil was careful about the title that he used for the Ottoman Empire and preferred to call his book *The Well-Protected Domains*.[11]

In this plural identity there was an ambiguity about who the 'Turk' was. Sina Aksin discusses this problem by looking at the family roots of the Ottoman dynasty. He draws attention to the established prejudices of the Ottoman elites towards the emigrant 'Turkmen' in Anatolia. Aksin says that the Ottoman dynasty was ethnically Turk in the first instance, and they spoke in Turkish. However, their ethnic origin from the Turkish Beylik of the Ottoman was not enough to solve the issue of Ottoman identity. Although their ethnic origin was Turk, the Ottoman sultans had chosen their wives mostly from the *cariyes* (women slave or concubine) who were non-Turks; the wives or mothers of the sultans were never Turkish. Hence, concludes Aksin, the 'Turkish blood' of the dynasty diminished in time. Apart from its ethnic notion, the term 'Turk' was usually used as a synonym for 'boorishness, roughness' among statesmen, because Turkishness was thought the equivalent of being a Turkmen, who was generally nomadic.[12] In this sense, the expression of *etrak-i bi idrak* (dumb Turks or the Turks who were unable to understand anything) was a common saying among the Ottoman elites. However, the Turks mentioned in this expression would probably be the Turkmens who were nomadic or farmers in Anatolia. The background to this approach is found not in ethnic identities but in class stratification. The rigid boundaries between the elites and the people or between *askeri* and *reaya* should not be ignored. The high officials of the Ottoman state saw themselves above these types of ethnic identities, including Turkishness.

A remarkable feature of the term *etrak* from the Ottoman territories deserves mention. The sixteenth and seventeenth century Arab world used the term *etrak* (the plural of Turk) to describe the uneducated and uncultured Turks. On the other hand, the term *Rum* was used for the cultural elite and ruling class of the Ottoman state. Hence, all Turkish-speaking people, regardless of ethnic or geographic origins, and including the Muslims in the Balkans, were called Turks in the Arab world. The upper class of the central Ottoman state was not the Turks but the *Rum* minority, according to them. The Arabs were generally aware of this division between the people and the centre of the Ottoman Empire but not much interested in it.[13]

This duality, frequently ignored by the Arabs, fitted into the self-assessment of the Ottomans. The Istanbul-centred ruling class, the artists or educated people did not see their cultural and social status as equal with the rest of the empire, not with a Turkish farmer, or an Albanian peasant. *Rum* identity, in fact, carried the privileged position of the people close to the sultan, or *Kayser-i Rum*. Hence, the expression of *Rum* mainly related to the geography around Istanbul. Etrak (the Turks) were one of the subject groups in Anatolia who had to be organized and taken under the control of the Ottoman administrators.

The structure of the centre–periphery relationship goes to the heart of the analysis of Ottoman identity. Before addressing the concept of *Rum*, it may be useful to discuss centre–periphery relations first. According to Serif Mardin, the Ottoman periphery did not differentiate Muslims from non-Muslims or a particular central

geography from the rest of the empire; on the other hand, it differentiated the Porte from the *reaya* who had different religious beliefs.[14] This differentiation shows that the non-Muslim *reaya* was not of an equal status with the Muslims. However, the differentiation based on the duality of central powers and the ordinary people was more effective than religious differences. The imperial structure made the centre-focused perspective the main element within the Ottoman system. The peripheral peoples, such as Turks (Etrak), were seen as different and distant from the Ottoman state. The intellectual and urbanized people had prejudices about countrymen who dealt mainly with agriculture, and the Turks were among all other countrymen of Anatolia. An original example of this prejudice came from the sixteenth century Ottoman poet, Guvahi. In his advisory *Nasihatname* (book of proverbs), he explained how the 'unconcerned' Turks could not get along with other urbanized people:

> *Sehirde rustay-i bi-gam olmaz* (The peasants of the village cannot stay in the city)
> *Hakikatdur bu soz Turk adem olmaz* (It is a fact that a Turk cannot be a [neat] man)
> *Dedugin anlamaz soylerse sozi* (He cannot understand what you say)
> *Bir olur Turk'e sozun ardi yuzi* (The beginning or end of a word means the same for a Turk) ...
> *Acayib taifedir kavm-i etrak* (The Turks are an interesting [weird] group)
> *Eyu tatli nedur itmezler idrak* (They cannot understand what a good dessert [good and nice] is)
> *Ne bilur anlarin agizlari tad* (Their mouths don't know any taste)
> *Ne soz var dillerinde idecek yad* (They don't have any word to mention).[15]

Guvahi's words reflected how an educated resident of Istanbul saw the Turks of the rural areas as ignorant and vulgar. He was not happy to see peasant Turks around him in the city. This attitude was widespread among the Ottoman intellectuals of the big cities, mainly Istanbul. The term *etrak* in the Ottoman Empire and the modern Turks should not be seen as similar. There may be some common ground between them, but the Turkish national identity did not emerge until the nineteenth century.[16] Turkishness did not mean ethnic identity for a long time in the Ottoman period. In fact, there is no agreement among Ottoman writers about it. While some of them preferred to use Turkishness as a term for Sunni/Islamic culture, others chose to use Turkish only in its socio-economic meaning. Above all, the root of the Ottoman dynasty depending on the Central Asian Kayi Boyu (clan) was well-known to everybody and the Turkish background was obvious. In this sense, Turkishness was sometimes mentioned as an inherited sense of warriorship, like the Central Asian ancestors. The *gaza* mission of the Ottoman state, which means to fight in the name of Allah, was never given up and it was always rewarded in Ottoman history. Hence, the Turk was honoured in some documents in the name of the *gazi* (war veteran) who is a courageous and heroic warrior.[17] Obviously, there were many different understandings of Turk in the Ottoman Empire, none of which fully encompassed ethnic or national components; the conditions of those times should not be considered from a modern perspective.

Ethnic identities were not dealt with by any Ottoman intellectual from the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries.

By way of discussing the Turk in the Ottoman Empire, the disputable case of the *etrak* and the Kizilbas (Red Heads) should be cited. Obviously, Kizilbas was an important 'other' figure for the Ottoman Empire. They were Turkish-speaking, mostly Turkmen and Shiite groups settled in the central and eastern parts of Anatolia. Their alarming sympathy towards the Safavids irritated the Ottomans. In fact, when Yavuz Sultan Selim won the Battle of Chaldran in 1514 against the Shia Safavids, he executed about 40,000 Kizilbas in Anatolia when he was returning to Istanbul. The Kizilbas had an important role in Ottoman–Iranian relations. Their possible separatist attitude in favour of re-establishing the Safavids was seen as a threat to the territorial integrity and stability of the Ottoman Empire. It was not only the Kizilbas who were excluded from the Ottoman identity. Tat (Iranian origin), Arab and Cepni (Turkmen) were among the other races that were excluded. As an example of this exclusion, it was written in some sultanate decrees that these groups around the district Tokat corrupted the Ottoman soldiers in the region by '*idlal*' (misleading) and '*igva*' (seduction).[18]

Among all these groups, the Kizilbas was the most ironic exclusion because of both its Muslim and Turkish character. In fact, the Islamic identity of the Ottoman state and the place of the caliphate can explain this irony. The Kizilbas people did not belong to the Hanafi sect, whereas the Ottoman sultan was the caliphate of the Sunni Muslims to which the Hanafi sect belongs. They were mostly Shiite and Alevi. Their heterodox belief system was deeply challenging to Ottoman Islam. Non-Muslims were accepted as regular minority groups of the empire living under the rule of Islam, but the stand towards the Muslim Alevis was a great uncertainty for the state. Their close relations with the Shiite world had never been approved by the Ottoman state. Their exclusion from the Ottoman identity was because of their different religious identity, which was difficult for the Ottoman state to define, and their potential collaboration with Iran. Hence, it may be plausible to think that the insulted *etrak* figure of the Ottoman elites also represented the Kizilbas in Anatolia, since they were the 'other' within the Muslim and Turkish identity. However, to equate the *etrak* and Kizilbas can be wrong because of the broader meaning of *etrak*. The Ottoman state saw the *etrak* as insignificant farmers of Anatolia who had nothing to do with education and culture, and this could include many ethnic or cultural differences. The Hanafi Muslim and Turkmen farmers of Anatolia did not escape of being labelled as *etrak* by the urban and educated Ottoman intellectuals. However, the Kizilbas meant a more serious threat linked to the fear of eastern civil disobedience. In short, these two concepts may sometimes have intersected with each other because of systematic exclusion, but they were not exactly the same group. Today, Kizilbas is seen as an insulting title in secular Turkey and was abandoned as a matter of courtesy. Anatolian Alevi is now preferred to Kizilbas.

The well-known writer and sociologist of pan-Turkism, Ziya Gokalp is an interesting example to mention here, because of his assertion regarding Ottoman identity, the difference of the state from its people and the Kizilbas. In his book *Turkculugun Esaslari* (The Principles of Turkism), published in 1923, he drew an apparent line between Ottomanism and Turkism, and showed how each side did not like the other at all.

While the Ottoman Empire was expanding and including hundreds of nations in its political sphere, the rulers and the ruled became two distinct classes. All the cosmopolitan rulers constructed the Ottoman class; the ruled Turkish people formed the Turkish class. These two classes did not like each other. The Ottoman class saw itself as the 'sovereign nation' (*millet-i hakime*) and accepted the Turks, whom they governed, as the 'inferior nation' (*millet-i mahkure*). The Ottoman always called the Turks 'Donkey Turks'; when an official person came to any town everybody tried to escape because the Ottomans were coming. Even the emergence of Kizilbas among the Turks can be explained by this distinction.[19]

Gokalp was very keen to separate Ottoman identity from Turkish identity, mostly as a part of a project of creating a new national identity. After he put the Turks into the oppressed class or the ruled class, he said that being a Kizilbas was because of the very distinction between the Ottoman and Turkish classes. Interestingly, Gokalp defined being Kizilbas as having sympathy to Iran, which was because of nothing but an illusion of some of the naïve Turkmens who believed the stories of Sheikh Cuneyd, the first sheikh of the Safavids.[20] Gokalp saw the Kizilbas as a type of misrepresentation and differentiated the Kizilbas from the Turks, as Ottoman statesmen had done before. This debate has a large literature and to discuss all of it is beyond the scope of this article. What matters is that Gokalp emphasized the dual-class structure of the Ottoman Empire and separated the ruled from the ruling elites. He designated the Turks as the ruled and oppressed class of the Ottoman Empire, while he pointed out in disgust that the Ottoman ruling elite held the power in the empire. He probably included noble Greek diplomats, Phanariot families or trades-men in the Ottoman ruling elite, since they were rich and close to the Ottoman state. The negative image of the *Rum* can be seen in this assertion as well.

Gokalp was mainly right about the place of the Turks among the ruled classes. He pointed out Ottoman identity as the identity of the ruling elites. In fact, the term of *Rum* can be more enlightening for understanding the identity of these elites. How the Ottoman state benefited from the term *Rum* in Ottoman identity in order to clarify social strata is the milestone of this study; the background of the Greek other within Turkish identity cannot be understood without understanding who the *Rum* are.

The inclusion of the term *Rum* in the Ottoman identity turned research about Turkish national identity into a conceptual confusion. Ottoman identity was complicated enough with its ethnic and religious plurality, and the term *Rum* may have been a reason for this confusion. However, the intersection of *Rum* and Ottoman is highly important to understand the common ground of Turkishness and Greekness. In other words, room can be found for the *Rum* within the Turkish identity, which can be dated back to the Ottoman past. The reasons why the Ottoman state tried to qualify itself with the *Rum* identity rather than Turkish identity, except for the last years of the empire, have significance in understanding the irony in Turkish identity and the otherization process. The *Rum* and *Rum* identity is one of the key concepts in both exploring the Ottoman social structure and defining the past experiences of Turkish national identity.

There are several questions to ask about the *Rum* character of Ottoman identity. Why did the Ottomans use the *Rumi dirhem* (unit of weight) or the *Rumi* calendar? Why was Mevlânâ Celaleddin-i Rumi (1207–73) called *Rum* although he lived in Anatolia? Why did some Ottoman sultans prefer the title of *Kayser-i Rum*? In answering

these questions, translating *Rum* as 'Greek' in the modern sense may carry us to the wrong conclusions. There is something beyond ethnicity which will be discussed below.

For a long time, the term *Rum*, disregarded or de-emphasized in contemporary literature, was the name of one of the non-Muslim Ottoman *millets*. However, beyond just referring to a *millet*, *Rum* also had a deep impact on Ottoman identity. In its popular meaning, the term *Rum* or *Rumi* (the adjectival form) had begun to be used by the Ottomans to define the people of Greek origin in the Ottoman Empire up until the formation of the Greek state. It was derived from the root 'Roman' denoting the descendants of the Eastern Roman Empire. There were also some important Greek activists of the Greek Revolution, such as Rigas Velestinlis (1757–98), who used the term *Rum* to denote the Greek nation itself.[21] After a while, this term turned into a general name for all Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire. After the establishment of the Greek Kingdom in 1832, the Ottoman state began to call citizens of the Greek Kingdom *Yunan* (derived from the word Ionian) and continued to call Ottoman subjects of Greek origin *Rum*.

Greek Orthodoxy and Greek ethnicity were seen as the two components of being *Rum*. These definitions became *galat-i meshur* (widespread misconception)[22] and the reductionism within the definition became widespread. In many translations of old Ottoman history books or the Sultan's *fermans* (imperial decree) the term *Rum*, which meant the Ottoman upper class or statesmen, was translated by the term *Turk*. Ozbaran points out the mistranslation of Mustafa Akdag, an important Turkish historian, of the term *Rum Yigitleri* (heroes) as 'Anatolian Turks' in several historical documents about battles. By using Anatolia instead of *Rum* and Turks instead of heroes, he ignores the plurality within Ottoman identity. Moreover, Akdag claims that the Janissaries and other kinds of *erens* (saint or *dervish*) who were sent to distant places were 'pure Turks'.[23] However, the Janissary corps included prisoners of war, slaves and Christian-born recruits from the rural areas of the Balkans.[24] Although they were trained and converted to Islam, they were not Turkish in origin. Akdag's preference for Turk instead of *Rum* may be an outcome of simplification or nationalization of history, a common action. It is part of national history-writing in Turkey, which may channel and even shape the history of a nation into an epic story appropriate to the contemporary interests of that nation.

In the Ottoman Empire, the term *Rum* is linked with not only Orthodoxy or Greek ethnicity, but also with the Roman and Byzantine empires. Next to the *Rum* title of the Ottoman upper class, the Orthodox Greek subjects were named the *Rum millet*. However, limiting the term to the Orthodox misses some important dynamics in Ottoman and Turkish identity. In some Ottoman documents, people living at the centre of *Rumeli* and Anatolia were defined as *Rum*. This definition is related to cultural boundaries within the Ottoman Empire, between the unknown or distant peoples like Arabs and ordinary Ottomans. Moreover, *Rum* was also used as a declaration of the possession of the lands of the Eastern Roman Empire.[25] The Ottoman state aimed neither at exclusion of the Turks nor inclusion of the Greeks, while it added the term *Rum* to its other labels. In fact, it had nothing to do with the *banal* ethnic identities of the subjects. It was a declaration of the greatness of the empire, as well as the Eastern Roman Empire, and a taking possession of the history of these lands from Roman times. To evaluate these identifications with a modern sense of nationalism weakens any analysis of Ottoman history.

One of the first attempts to analyse the *Rum* aspect of the Ottomans was made by the Austrian historian Paul Wittek in the 1930s. He offered the term 'Rum Turks' instead of Ottoman. He explained how this new term was more useful in explaining the facts from history and said that it included the nomadic and settled Turks, Turkified subjects and the *gaza* culture of the Ottomans. Moreover, by using the term *Rum*, the large contribution of Roman heritage to Turkish colourfulness could, according to Wittek, be included.[26] He articulated this historical proposition during the heyday of Turkey's nationalist project, and his thesis did not create a sizeable echo among either Turkish or Greek historians. His theory that *Rum* did not necessarily mean an Orthodox Greek, but a Turkish civilization constructed on Roman heritage was not sufficiently appreciated. A *Rum* background was not acceptable during those days of the Turkish History Thesis. He was accused of insulting the Ottomans and the Turks by saying that they were not capable of constructing a civilization alone.

Fuat Koprulu was one of the Turkish historians who first mentioned the *Rum* in relation to Ottoman identity and Turkish history. He joined the debates of the Turkish History Thesis in the first Turkish Congress of History as an important Ottoman historian. Because of his proficiency in Ottoman history, he did not fully depend on research about Turkish history hurriedly done in the early Republican era and advised waiting for more detailed analysis before composing a fully-fledged history. Moreover, he warned everybody about the confusion of the terms *Rum* and Turk. According to him, the importance of the *Rum* in Ottoman history was not to be neglected. He advised more documentary research on the Turk, Mongol, Tatar or *Rum* components within the Ottoman identity.[27] However, his views, which may 'blur' Turkish identity, were not welcomed. At the Congress, where nationalist history writing might have seemed to be the dominant aim of the participants, he was forced to assume an apologetic attitude and declared that his ideas had changed.[28] He may be one of the few historians who tried to analyse Ottoman history through an Ottoman lens, not behind a Turkish one. Neither Wittek nor Koprulu were successful with their warnings on the wide range of Ottoman identity. Salih Ozbaran re-introduced Paul Wittek to Turkish historians and released hidden parts of Turkish history. Although, before Ozbaran, the *Rum* identity of the Ottomans had often been referred to in many books, detailed archival research had not been carried out.

As the Ottoman Empire encompassed a large territory, some parts of the frontier provinces, such as the Arabs or some northern Balkan peoples, were excluded from the central identity of the state. Territories within Anatolia and Rumelia, or in other words the *Rum* territories, were accepted as the centre on which the state had an authoritarian hegemony. Although *Rum* and *Rumeli* seemed to be overlapping; the former as the name of the people and the other as their lands, there is much more than just homophony between the words. Rumeli or Rum-ili were both the name of the Balkan Peninsula given by the Ottoman state and, at the same time, the administrative unit representing this territory, which means the Romania of the Greeks. As Halil Inalcik, Fuat Koprulu's student, explains, the term Rumeli was used by the Ottoman state in the same context as the term Anatolia and it referred to the lands seized from Byzantium. On the other hand, the name *Rum* kept its older meaning and continued to be the geographical name pointing to the territories the

Seljuks had ruled in Asia Minor.[29] According to Inalcik, the Ottoman *Rum* can be defined as the 'melting pot' which was an amalgam of the people and culture, either Christian *Rum* or Muslim Turk.[30]

The Rumeli Beylerbeyligi (General Governorate of Rumelia) and Anadolu Beylerbeyligi (General Governorate of Anatolia) were regarded by the Ottomans as the administrative units which were the nucleus of the state. In practice, Rumeli Beylerbeyi had a higher position than the Anadolu Beylerbeyi because of the strategic importance of Rumeli. When an Anadolu Beylerbeyi was promoted he became a Rumeli Beylerbeyi. The historian Paul Wittek points out that the Ottoman

Figure 1. Map of Rumelia in 1801.
Source: W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire*: *1801–1913* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1913).

Rumeli was similar to the Byzantine period regarding the territory Disis-Bati. The Ottomans did not ignore this historical geography which had a rich ancient culture. The boundaries of Rumeli were from Albania to Istanbul in the north and Morea in the south. With the expansion into the Balkans the boundaries extended along the Danube to the shores of the Black Sea. It included a geography which takes in today's Bulgaria, south Serbia, Macedonia and Greece. The Orthodox Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, like the Bosnian or Austrian principalities, were seen as the exterior parts of the Ottoman system living in the distant places of the Rumeli unit.[31]

Another confusing point about the term *Rum* now becomes visible: although the Orthodox Greek *millet* was named the *Rums*, they were still not the central figure of the *Devlet-i Rum*. This definition of *Devlet-i Rum* embraced the multicultural amalgam of the Ottoman state under the control of the sultan. As discussed, it had an implication about the gap between the rulers and the ruled. Neither the Turks nor the Orthodox Greeks were able to dominate alone within the plurality of the Ottomans. It was the sultan and the *askeri* group who dominated. The concept of *Rum* was the reflection of self-identification of the Ottoman rulers and the nobility.

Their self-identification was accepted in many countries which were in contact with the Ottoman Empire. While narrating the Ankara War (1402) between the Ottoman and Timurid empires, Tamerlane called Yildirim Beyazid *Kayser-i Rum* in his memoirs.[32] Numerous examples of labelling the Ottomans as *Rum* exist in history. Before the Ottoman Empire took control of Yemen in 1517, there were many Ottoman soldiers, mariners, artillery or gunmen in Yemen and India. The locals named these people *Rum* or *Rumlu*; outside the Ottoman territories such as the Arab lands, Iran, Central Asia or Indonesia, the title *Rum* meant 'Ottoman'. In fact, these *Rum* people not only consisted of the people who were sent by Beyazid II to the Mamluks until 1509, but adventurers from Western Anatolia or Karaman were also accepted as *Rum*.[33] Although the West has called the Ottomans 'Turks' since the eleventh century, eastern people generally saw the Ottomans as *Rum*, which was generally used for Ottomans in Anatolia and Rumeli.

The eminent western historian Bernard Lewis, known for his work on Turks, wrote about this confusion:

> The name of Turkey has been given to Turkish-speaking Anatolia almost since its first conquest by the Turks in the eleventh century – given, that is, by Europeans. But the Turks themselves did not adopt it as the official name of their country until 1923 ... [I]n the Imperial society of the Ottomans the ethnic term Turk was little used, and then chiefly in a rather derogatory sense, to designate the Turcoman nomads or, rather, the ignorant and uncouth Turkish peasants of the Anatolian villages. To apply it to an Ottoman gentle man of Constantinopolis would have been an insult.[34]

Although Lewis stated the fact that the term 'Turk' was not used in the Ottoman understanding with the same meaning as for Europeans, ironically he did not hesitate to use 'Turk' as the general name of the Ottoman Empire or previous civilizations of Anatolia in other parts of his book, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*.[35] In another book Lewis felt the need to mention that when the Ottomans talked about themselves they used different names for different functions. When they

wanted to mention their religious authority they used *Memalik-i Islam*; when they wanted to denote the Ottoman dynasty they chose *Al-i Osman* or, if it was necessary to define the state in geographical terms, they signified the territories they inherited from the Romans and said *Memleket-i Rum*.[36]

The *Rum* identity of the Ottomans did not have an ethnic or national boundary. The possession of the Roman territories and the mixture of cultures in these territories were the main components of this identity. The large Ottoman picture has to be remembered without getting caught out by prejudices about the Turkishness of the Ottoman Empire. İlber Ortayli adopts a challenging definition and describes the Ottoman Empire as 'the Muslim Rome'. He asserts that the Ottoman Empire was the only state in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region which resembled the classical Roman Empire. He says that the Ottoman state was strict about its Turkish language but most of its bureaucrats were Greeks or Armenians, especially in the nineteenth century. However, the organizational culture and the social amalgamation were designed as in the Roman Empire. Therefore, he defines the Ottoman Empire as the '3rd Roman Empire' which was the Muslim version of the last one.[37] It may seem to be too radical to assess the Ottoman Empire as the third Roman Empire, but this approach is useful to crack the prejudices about the different dimensions of the Ottoman structure.

Among the Seljuks, Sassanids, Russians or Persians, it was the Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman) that had an important place for Ottoman imperial heritage.[38] It seems that the rule of large territories captured from the 'huge' Eastern Roman Empire was turned into a matter of pride for the state and this geography was defined as the lands of the *Rum*. In addition, people close to the Sultan (*askeri*) felt themselves to be different from the rest of the 'ordinary' people (*reaya*), no matter which *millet* they were from. In order to specify their high culture and upper social status, they preferred the term *Rum* to any ethnic identity. The boundaries of *Rum* were not around the empire, but inside it. It was based around the Ottoman imperial culture within the empire, which did not extend to the distant lands which the authority of the state could not reach. Besides, there was not enough data for a feeling of ethnic identity in the Ottoman Empire, at least in terms of modern conceptions. Although, as a part of the system, an Orthodox Greek or a Muslim Turk was aware of his or her religious and linguistic difference, being subjects of the Ottoman sultan became the main commonality or a kind of identity.

The different usages of the term and their importance can be briefly explained in three ways. Firstly, there was a difference between the Greek-cultured Orthodox *Rum millet* and the Muslim Ottoman *Rum* identity. While the former was a definition of the Orthodox people, the latter was a preferred identity of the administrators, poets or artists in the Ottoman state. The second point was the importance of Rumeli as an area which was the central territory of the empire in Anatolia. The Ottoman system was not based on strict central administration. North African territories, the European territories beyond Bulgaria or the Middle Eastern territories were mostly of secondary concern for the Ottoman state; and it was only Anatolia and Rumeli where the heart of the state beat. The third important point about the concept is the appreciation of the size of the Roman Empire. To use the title of *Kayzer-i Rum* became an open declaration of the magnitude of the Ottoman sultans, who were able to govern all the Roman lands. The term of *Rum*,

which denotes the Roman Empire or the Orthodox people, was vital to Ottoman identity at least for the ruling elite, for long centuries until the last decades of the Empire. Yet a careful analysis of the role of the *Rum* concept within the Ottoman identity can be complementary for contemporary history studies.

To conclude, Ottoman identity has been examined through its Islamic, Turkish and *Rum* characteristics. The stereotypes in Ottoman history related to its religious, ethnic and social structure were re-read with a sceptical eye. The Ottoman Empire has been frequently defined as a 'Turkish and Muslim Empire'. However, as the analysis in this article shows, there may be several reservations about the Islamic and Turkish identity of the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, despite being easy to describe the Ottoman Empire an Islamic state, the system was not a full-fledged *Shariat*. Islam had a great impact in many areas of life in the empire but the Ottoman sultans' authority was still superior to Islamic codes in any application. Therefore, instead of a conventional *Shariat*, the religious construct of the Ottoman Empire may be better defined as 'Ottoman Islam', denoting the *sui generis* Islamic culture of both the state and the people.

Along with religion, the ethnic identity of the Ottoman Empire is another polemical subject among Ottoman historians. Its imperial construct over many different ethnicities, peoples and territories made it impossible to define the Empire easily as a Turkish state. In this plural identity there is an ambiguity about how to define 'Turk'. It is known that the main language of the Ottoman Empire was Turkish. Besides it was largely accepted that the ethnic origin of the Ottoman dynasty had ties with the Central Asian Turkic Kayi Boyu (clan). Next to epistemological problems about the certainty of the sources linking the Ottoman dynasty with Central Asian ancestors, there was also a problematic viewpoint of the state and the ruling elites about the 'Turkmen' in Anatolia. Above its ethnic inference, the term 'Turk' was usually used among statesmen as a synonym for 'roughness', as a way of putting distance between themselves and the nomadic culture of the Turkmen in Anatolia. In this sense, the elites' common expression of *etrak-i bi idrak* (dumb Turks or the Turks who were unable to understand anything) has to be taken into consideration in any study of the Turkish identity of the Ottoman Empire.

The backdrop of this elitist approach may also stand for the class stratification of the Ottoman Empire which triggered the critical decomposition of society into the 'rulers' and the 'ruled'. Thus, the ruling elite, formed by the high officials, administrators or rich people close to the Ottoman state, saw themselves above any type of ethnic or social culture of the ruled people. It is exactly this idea that lies beneath the integration of the notion of *Rum* identity into Ottoman identity. Ottoman identity was not a widespread social identity; it was, rather, a way of highlighting the very culture of the ruling elites. The name, *Rum*, was used as a term indicating a source of pride because of the hegemony of the Ottoman central powers over the inherited territories of the Eastern Roman Empire. What is interesting here is that the specific name of the Greek Orthodox people was also used by the ruling elite to refer to their 'privileged culture'. Hence, '*Devlet-i Aliye*' (the Sublime State) of the Empire were the Turkish-speaking Muslim *Rums* living on the lands of the Roman Empire and synthesized many cultures in its cosmopolite construct.

Consequently, the ethno-religious expression of the Orthodox Greek people and the geographical expression of the Rumeli zone gained a distinctive spirit highlighting a kind of cultural elitism in the Ottoman Empire.

With or without ethnic reference, the *Rum* indication in Ottoman identity may carry Ottoman history studies to a more plural level of analysis and free it from contemporary nationalist ideologies by melting Muslim, Turkish, Greek, Roman, Ottoman or Orthodox concepts in the same pot. It is no surprise to see that the *Rum* emphasis within the Ottoman identity was forgotten while the official histories of Turkish and Greek nation-states were based upon 'pure' Turkish or Greek identities. In this sense, this article can be seen as an attempt to re-read the terminology and to avoid any nationalist reductionism in studying Ottoman identity and history.

Notes

1. C. Kucuk, 'Osmanlı Imparatorlugu'nda ''Millet Sistemi'' ve Tanzimat', in H. İnalcık and M. Seyitdanlioglu (eds.), *Tanzimat: Degisim Surecinde Osmanli Imparatorlugu*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Phoenix, 2006), p.394.
2. I. Ortayli, *Ottoman Studies* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp.18–19.
3. Halil Inalcik explained this attitude with the Islamic *Gaza* tendency (fighting in the name of Allah) of the Ottomans. According to Inalcik, the conquest of lands in the name of God, had been the Ottoman motivation of the since its formation. For his interpretation of the *Gaza* idea please see, 'Halil Inalcik ile Soylesi: Osmanli Tarihi En Cok Saptirilmis, Tek Yanli Yorumlanmis Tarihtir', Interview by I. Ortayli, *Cogito*, Vol.19 (Summer 1999), pp.25–41.
4. Needless to say, this hypothesis about the origin of the Ottoman sultans' names should be analysed by etymologists and linguists, in order to banish with any misconceptions. However, this type of linguistic study is beyond the limits of this study.
5. H. Inalcik, *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1995), pp.141–43.
6. K. Karpat, 'Tarihsel Sureklilik, Kimlik Degisimi ya da Yenilikci, Musluman, Osmanli ve Turk Olmak', in K. Karpat (ed.), *Osmanli Gecmisi ve Bugunun Turkiyesi* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2005), p.35.
7. F. Georgeon, *Osmanli-Turk Modernlesmesi (1900–1930)*, trans. A. Berktay (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 2006), p.12.
8. Ortayli, *Ottoman Studies*, p.15.
9. S. Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi: 14.–17. Yuzyillarda Rum/Rumi Aidiyet ve Imgeleri* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi, 2004), pp.38–9.
10. H. Inalcik, 'The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case', in L.C. Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia United Press, 1996), p.19.
11. S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998).
12. S. Aksin, 'Osmanli Devleti Uzerine', in S. Aksin (ed.), *Ataturkcu Partiyi Kurmanin Sirasi Geldi* (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 2002), p.152.
13. Quoted from U. Haarmann, 'Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turks from the Abbasids to Modern Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.20 (1988), pp.177 and 191, quoted in Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, pp.51 and 60–61.
14. S. Mardin, 'Center–Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics', *Daedalus*, Vol.1, No.102 (1973), pp.169–90.
15. The text was translated into English from Turkish by the author of this article and some explanations or hidden meanings were added within square brackets in order to give the original meaning. Quoted from Guvahi, ed. M. Hengrimen, *Pend-name* (Ankara, 1981), p.165, quoted in H. Erdem, '''Osmanli Kaynaklarindan Yansiyan Turk Imaj(lar)i' in O. Kumrular (ed.), *Dunyada Turk Imgesi* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi, 2005), pp.24–5.
16. Karpat, 'Tarihsel Sureklilik, Kimlik Degisimi ya da Yenilikci, Musluman, Osmanli ve Turk Olmak', pp.42–4.

17. Erdem, 'Osmanli Kaynaklarindan Yansiyan Turk Imaj(lar)i', pp.19–25.

18. Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, p.107.

19. The text was translated from Turkish to English by the author of this article. Z. Gokalp, *Turkculugun Esaslari* (*Bordo Siyah Turk Klasikleri Inceleme*), ed. K. Bek (Istanbul: Trend Yayin Basin, 2006; originally published 1923), pp.68–9.

20. Ibid., p.69.

21. H. Millas, *Gecmisten Bugune Yunanlilar: Dil, Din ve Kimlikleri* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2003), p.163.

22. This term is a shorter version of the idiom *Galat-i Meshur Lugat-i Fasihadan Evladir*, which means that a common misusage of a concept may legalize this usage, although it is defined differently in the dictionary. Salih Ozbaran used the expression, *galat-i meshur* to mention the wrong conceptualization of *Rum*; Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, p.89.

23. Quoted from M. Akdag, *Turkiye'nin Iktisadi ve Ictimai Tarihi* 1 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1971), pp.107–9 quoted in Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, p.89.

24. J. McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923* (New York: Longman Limited, 1997), pp.124–5, or for a more detailed analysis, please see G. Goodwin, *The Janissaries* (London, San Francisco and Beirut: Saqi Books, 2006).

25. Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, pp.90–91.

26. Quoted from P. Wittek, 'Rum Sultani', *Bati Dillerinde Osmanli Tarihleri* (Istanbul: Turkiye Yayinevi, 1971), pp.95–9, quoted in Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, p.49.

27. F. Koprulu, *Turk Edebiyatinda Ilk Mutasavviflar*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1976), p.257; B.E. Behar, *Iktidar ve Tarih: Turkiye'de 'Resmi Tarih' Tezinin Olusumu (1929–1937)* (Istanbul: AFA Yayinlari, 1992), pp.109–10.

28. For discussions of the First Turkish Congress of History, see Behar, *Iktidar ve Tarih*, pp.119–60.

29. H. Inalcik, '*Rumeli*' in *Islam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Diyanet Vakfi, 1988).

30. H. Inalcik, 'Kultur Etkilesimi, Kuresellesme', *Dogu Bati* (*Dunya Neyi Tartisiyor: Kuresellesme 1*), No.18 (2002), pp.97–8.

31. From Wittek, 'Rum Sultani', p.89, quoted in Ozbaran, *Bir Osmanli Kimligi*, p.49.

32. S.E.T.M.T. Bahadiroglu, *Timur'un Gunlugu: Tuzukat- i Timur*, trans. and ed. A. Aslan and K. Sakirov (Istanbul: Insan Yayinlari, 2010), pp.66–7.

33. H. Inalcik, 'The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East', in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society and Society in the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.204.

34. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; originally published 1961), pp.1–2.

35. Lewis went beyond the Ottoman and put a question mark over the Hittite–Turk relationship and said, 'The survival of Anatolian elements in modern Turkey is now beyond dispute. There is no need to assert that Turks are Hittites or that the Hittites were Turks – but it is clear that there was a large measure of continuity'. Ibid., p.4.

36. B. Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p.11.

37. I. Ortayli, 'Ucuncu Roma Imparatorlugu', *Hurriyet*, 18 Oct. 1999.

38. Ismail Tokalak underlines the similarities between the Ottoman and Byzantine cultures and organizations. He claims that the Turks had undergone a change with the influence of Byzantium with which they lived for 400 years, since they came to Anatolia in the eleventh century. Not only the Turkish culture, social structure or political organizations changed, but also the racial appearance of the Turks had changed during the mixture with Byzantium. I. Tokalak, *Bizans-Osmanli Sentezi: Bizans Kultur ve Kurumlarinin Osmanli Uzerinde Etkisi* (Istanbul: Guler Boy Yayincilik, 2006).